Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India: Why the Supreme Court Struck Down Electoral Bonds

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In Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, the Supreme Court unanimously declared the Electoral Bond Scheme unconstitutional. It held that secrecy surrounding political contributions violated voters’ right to information under Article 19(1)(a). The Court separately invalidated the removal of limits on corporate political contributions, linking electoral transparency and financial regulation with political equality and free and fair elections.

Case Details

ParticularDetails
Case nameAssociation for Democratic Reforms and Another v. Union of India and Others
CourtSupreme Court of India
Case numberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 880 of 2017, with connected petitions
Judgment date15 February 2024
BenchChief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justices Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra
Citation2024 INSC 113; [2024] 2 SCR 420
Nature of decisionFinal Constitution Bench judgment, with a separate concurring opinion

Background and Material Facts

The Finance Act, 2017 amended several laws governing political contributions. The Electoral Bond Scheme, notified on 2 January 2018, then introduced a banking instrument through which eligible persons could contribute to eligible political parties.

Purchasers bought bonds from the State Bank of India after completing identification requirements. Political parties could redeem them through designated accounts.

The purchaser’s identity was not ordinarily disclosed to the public. Corresponding statutory changes exempted bond contributions from disclosure requirements and removed the cap on corporate political donations.

The petitioners challenged this framework under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Procedural History

The litigation involved challenges to the statutory amendments and the Scheme, followed by interim proceedings concerning disclosure.

The Constitution Bench ultimately examined the substantive fundamental rights challenges. It left outside this judgment the separate question concerning the Finance Act’s passage as a Money Bill.

The February 2024 decision finally determined the constitutional issues before the Bench. Subsequent orders addressed implementation of its disclosure directions.

Issues Before the Court

The Court considered whether:

  • Non-disclosure of political contributions violated citizens’ right to information under Article 19(1)(a).
  • Unlimited corporate contributions violated Article 14 and the principles underlying free and fair elections.

Arguments of the Parties

The petitioners argued that anonymity prevented voters from examining relationships between political funding, governmental decisions and corporate interests. They also challenged unlimited corporate contributions as a source of disproportionate political influence.

The Union defended the Scheme as a reform encouraging donations through banking channels and reducing unaccounted money.

It argued that confidentiality protected donors against retaliation, preserved the privacy of political affiliation and encouraged legitimate contributions. It also sought judicial restraint, characterising the framework as involving economic policy.

ProvisionRelevance to the dispute
Article 19(1)(a)Constitutional basis of voters’ right to information
Article 14Equality and protection against manifestly arbitrary legislation
Section 29C, Representation of the People Act, 1951Reporting of political contributions; the amendment exempted electoral bonds
Section 13A(b), Income-tax Act, 1961Record-keeping requirements relevant to political parties’ tax exemption
Section 182, Companies Act, 2013Corporate contribution limits and disclosure
Section 31(3), RBI Act, 1934Statutory authorisation for electoral bonds

Before the 2017 amendment, corporate contributions were capped at 7.5% of average net profits during the three immediately preceding financial years.

Court’s Reasoning

Political funding matters to an informed vote

The Court developed earlier decisions recognising voters’ right to information, including Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India.

It explained that political parties are central to India’s electoral system. Information relevant to voting therefore extends beyond the personal details of individual candidates.

Financial contributions can provide access to decision-makers and create opportunities for reciprocal benefits. Disclosure enables citizens to examine possible connections between donations and public policy.

The Court’s discussion addressed structural risks in political financing. Findings about specific criminal transactions would require separate proceedings.

Banking channels did not justify blanket secrecy

The Union’s argument combined two propositions: banking transactions would reduce unaccounted money, and anonymity would encourage donors to use those channels.

The lead opinion held that curbing black money was not a ground specified in Article 19(2) for restricting speech and information rights.

It also examined the Scheme through proportionality: whether the restriction pursued an acceptable objective through suitable and sufficiently restrained means. Alternative funding arrangements, including electoral trusts and other banking channels, demonstrated that blanket anonymity was not the least restrictive approach.

Donor privacy required a genuine balance

The Court recognised that political contributions can reveal political affiliation and therefore engage informational privacy.

It did not establish an automatic hierarchy placing transparency above privacy in every situation. Instead, the lead opinion applied double proportionality, examining the measure from the perspective of both competing rights.

The Scheme protected secrecy while denying voters access to contribution details. Earlier threshold-based disclosure requirements illustrated an alternative that accommodated both interests more effectively. The Court did not determine whether the existing disclosure threshold itself was ideal.

Unlimited corporate funding was manifestly arbitrary

The Court separately examined the removal of the corporate contribution cap.

Companies possess financial resources and opportunities for political influence that differ substantially from those of individual donors. Treating them alike ignored these differences.

The amendment also permitted contributions by loss-making companies without recognising the heightened concerns associated with such funding.

The lead opinion held that the change enabled unrestrained corporate influence and was manifestly arbitrary under Article 14. Its reasoning concerned both unequal financial power and the integrity of the electoral process.

Justice Sanjiv Khanna’s Concurring Opinion

Chief Justice Chandrachud wrote for himself and Justices Gavai, Pardiwala and Misra. Justice Khanna agreed with the outcome but supplied separate reasoning.

He developed his analysis through proportionality, examining the Scheme’s objectives, rational connection, alternatives and effects on voters’ rights. For the corporate contribution amendment, he preferred proportionality as a framework encompassing manifest arbitrariness.

He also expressly held Section 31(3) of the RBI Act and its accompanying Explanation unconstitutional.

There was no dissent supporting the Scheme. The differences concerned the reasoning and formulation of the conclusions.

Decision and Final Directions

The Court invalidated the Scheme and the challenged non-disclosure amendments. It also struck down the deletion of the corporate contribution cap.

Its original directions required:

  • Immediate cessation of further electoral bond issuance.
  • SBI’s disclosure to the Election Commission of purchase and redemption details from 12 April 2019 to the judgment date.
  • Submission by SBI by 6 March 2024 and publication by the Election Commission by 13 March 2024.
  • Return of unencashed bonds still within their fifteen-day validity period, with refunds to purchasers’ accounts.

These were consequential directions giving effect to the constitutional ruling. The writ petitions were disposed of. api.sci.gov.in

Subsequent Orders and Review

The original deadlines must be distinguished from the later implementation orders.

On 11 March 2024, the Court rejected SBI’s request for time until June. It directed disclosure by the close of business on 12 March and publication by the Election Commission by 5 pm on 15 March. webapi.sci.gov.in

On 18 March 2024, it clarified that complete disclosure included the bonds’ alphanumeric and serial numbers. SBI’s Chairman and Managing Director had to file a compliance affidavit by 5 pm on 21 March. gujarathighcourt.nic.in

Review petitions challenging the February judgment were dismissed on 25 September 2024, with the Court finding no error apparent warranting review. api.sci.gov.in

Ratio Decidendi

Voters’ constitutional right to information extends to political contributions relevant to informed electoral choice. A blanket non-disclosure framework cannot survive merely because it promotes banking transactions or invokes donor privacy.

Separately, removing corporate contribution limits was unconstitutional because the amendment disregarded material differences between contributors and enabled disproportionate corporate influence.

The decision did not prohibit every corporate political contribution or require disclosure of every small donation.

The judgment’s analytical value lies in connecting electoral rights with privacy, proportionality and substantive equality.

For examination answers and research, distinguish the two constitutional findings: secrecy violated Article 19(1)(a), while unlimited corporate contributions violated Article 14. For practical work, also separate the February judgment from the later orders implementing disclosure.

Key Takeaways

  • Political funding information forms part of voters’ constitutional right to know.
  • Donor privacy requires balancing rather than blanket secrecy.
  • Unlimited corporate contributions failed constitutional scrutiny.
  • Justice Khanna concurred through distinct proportionality reasoning.
  • Later orders clarified disclosure requirements, and the review petitions were dismissed.

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