Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India: Supreme Court Quashes Remission Granted to 11 Convicts

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, the Supreme Court quashed the Gujarat Government’s orders granting remission to 11 convicts in the Bilkis Bano case. The Court held that Maharashtra was the competent State because the trial and sentencing had taken place there. It also found serious legal defects in the remission process and directed the convicts to return to prison within two weeks. The judgment explains how executive remission remains subject to statutory limits and judicial review.

Case Details

Detail	Particulars
Case name	Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others
Court	Supreme Court of India
Case number	Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 491 of 2022, with connected petitions
Judgment date	8 January 2024
Bench	B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan JJ.
Citation	2024 INSC 24; (2024) 5 SCC 481
Nature of decision	Final judgment allowing the victim’s petition and quashing the remission orders
Opinion	Unanimous; judgment authored by B.V. Nagarathna J.

Background and Material Facts

The case arose from crimes committed during the 2002 violence in Gujarat, including the gang rape of Bilkis Bano and murders of members of her family.

Following Supreme Court intervention, the investigation was transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation. In 2004, the Court transferred the trial from Gujarat to Mumbai.

On 21 January 2008, the Special Court in Mumbai convicted 11 accused and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Their convictions were subsequently upheld by the Bombay High Court.

The Gujarat Government granted remission through orders dated 10 August 2022, leading to their release.

Remission affects the punishment remaining to be undergone. It does not erase the conviction or amount to an acquittal.

Procedural History

An important preceding development was the Supreme Court’s order dated 13 May 2022 in proceedings brought by one convict, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah.

That order directed Gujarat to consider his remission application under its 1992 policy. Gujarat subsequently considered the cases of all 11 convicts and granted remission.

Bilkis Bano challenged those orders under Article 32. Other petitioners also instituted public interest proceedings questioning the releases.

The January 2024 judgment examined both Gujarat’s authority and the legality of the resulting orders.

Also Read: Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union (1976)

Issues Before the Court

The principal questions were:

• Could Bilkis Bano directly challenge the remission orders under Article 32?
• Were the accompanying public interest petitions maintainable?
• Was Gujarat the appropriate Government to consider remission?
• Did the remission orders comply with the governing law?
• What consequences should follow if those orders were invalidated?

Arguments of the Parties

Bilkis Bano argued that Maharashtra alone had authority to consider remission because the convicts had been tried and sentenced there. She also challenged the handling of the convicting court’s opinion and the application of Gujarat’s remission policy.

Gujarat relied on the Supreme Court’s May 2022 direction. It maintained that the prescribed process had been followed, relevant opinions obtained and the Central Government’s approval secured.

The State and convicts also relied on the period of imprisonment undergone and their claimed satisfactory conduct.

The convicts opposed maintainability and argued that the proceedings could not be used to question a final order of another coordinate Bench of the Supreme Court.

Relevant Legal Provisions

The judgment examined the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which governed the challenged decisions.

Section 432(1) empowered the appropriate Government to suspend or remit a sentence.

Section 432(2) addressed obtaining a reasoned opinion from the presiding judge of the court before or by which the conviction was entered or confirmed.

Section 432(7) identified the appropriate Government. Under clause (b), the relevant State Government was the Government of the State within which the offender was sentenced.

Article 32 supplied the constitutional basis for Bilkis Bano’s petition.

Articles 14 and 142 were relevant to the Court’s consideration of the rule of law and the request to protect the convicts’ liberty after their release.

Court’s Reasoning

Maharashtra was the appropriate Government

The Court read Section 432(7) together with the remission power and the procedure involving the sentencing court.

The statutory connection was with the State where the offender was sentenced. The location of the crime or the prison in which the sentence was being served did not determine competence under Section 432(7)(b).

Because the trial and sentencing had occurred in Mumbai, Maharashtra was the appropriate Government.

The Court relied on earlier decisions, including State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh, (1976) 3 SCC 470. Transferring a prisoner to a prison in another State did not transfer the statutory authority to decide remission.

Gujarat therefore lacked jurisdiction to make the impugned orders.

The May 2022 direction could not sustain the releases

The earlier Supreme Court direction required particular attention because Gujarat relied on it as the basis for acting.

The Court found that Radheshyam Shah had suppressed material facts concerning earlier proceedings and his remission application before Maharashtra. That application had already generated adverse opinions from relevant authorities.

The Court consequently treated the May 2022 order as having been fraudulently obtained and therefore legally ineffective.

It also held that the order was per incuriam: rendered without following binding legal authority, including larger-Bench decisions concerning the appropriate Government.

This reasoning was essential to addressing the objection that a coordinate Bench’s final decision could not be questioned in the proceedings.

Mandatory procedural safeguards were undermined

The Court held that obtaining the reasoned opinion contemplated by Section 432(2) was mandatory.

The relevant opinion was that of the court connected with the conviction. The Special Judge in Mumbai had opposed premature release, but the Court found that this opinion had been rendered ineffective in the decision-making process.

The opinion of the Sessions Judge at Dahod could not replace the required judicial input from the proper court.

The Court also identified failure to account for court-ordered fines as a relevant defect. Remission required an informed exercise of lawful discretion, rather than reliance on selected favourable material.

The victim’s petition was maintainable

The Court entertained Bilkis Bano’s Article 32 petition and held that she was not required first to approach the Gujarat High Court under Article 226.

However, it left open the broader question of whether other citizens could maintain public interest petitions challenging remission orders.

The judgment should therefore not be cited as conclusively deciding every question about third-party standing in remission litigation.

Article 142 did not justify continuing the release

The convicts sought protection of their liberty after having remained outside prison.

The Court declined to exercise Article 142 to preserve a position created by orders it had found unlawful. It held that the consequences of quashing the remission orders had to follow and that the position before the releases must be restored.

Also Read: Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh: Mandatory FIR Registration and Preliminary Inquiry

Decision and Final Directions

The Supreme Court quashed the remission orders dated 10 August 2022 concerning all 11 convicts.

It allowed Bilkis Bano’s petition and directed the convicts to report to the concerned jail authorities within two weeks of the judgment. The connected writ petitions and pending applications were disposed of.

The judgment concerned the legality of remission. It did not reconsider the underlying convictions.

There were no separate concurring or dissenting opinions.

Subsequent Review

On 26 September 2024, the Supreme Court dismissed Gujarat’s review petition and a connected review petition.

The Bench found no apparent error or other merit warranting reconsideration of the January judgment. Gujarat’s petition was registered as Review Petition (Criminal) No. 262 of 2024.

Ratio Decidendi

For remission governed by Section 432(7)(b), the competent State Government is determined by where the offender was sentenced. The place of the offence or subsequent imprisonment does not independently confer that authority.

Remission orders made without jurisdiction cannot survive merely because release has already occurred. The decision also confirms the importance of the prescribed judicial opinion and scrutiny of decisions obtained through suppression of material facts.

The ruling invalidated these particular orders; it did not decide every possible future remission application under the applicable law.

Also Check: S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981)

Significance for Law Students and Legal Practice

As an analytical matter, this judgment connects criminal procedure with administrative law. It demonstrates that identifying the authority empowered to act must precede examining whether its decision was otherwise justified.

For examinations, it is useful for remission, judicial review, fraud on the court and per incuriam decisions.

For practice, it highlights the importance of the trial’s location, complete disclosure of earlier proceedings, the correct judicial opinion and reasoned consideration of relevant material.

Also Read: Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat (1965)

Key Takeaways

• Maharashtra was the competent State because the trial and sentencing occurred there.
• Gujarat’s remission orders were quashed for lack of jurisdiction and additional legal defects.
• The Court treated the May 2022 direction as fraudulently obtained and per incuriam.
• Bilkis Bano’s Article 32 petition was maintainable; the broader PIL question remained open.
• All 11 convicts were directed to return to prison within two weeks.