Sabarimala and the Law: Can Religious Tradition Override a Woman’s Constitutional Rights in India?

Author

Sanskriti is a fourth-year law student at the Faculty of Law, J.N.V.U., Jodhpur, with a growing academic interest in Human Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law and Public International Law. Her academic interest is focused on examining the relationship between law and individual rights, and social justice.

Can a Woman Be Excluded from a Public Place of Religion on the Basis of Her Biological Identity?

This question is at the centre of the ongoing debate between those who oppose the exclusion of women in particular religious shrines in India. The issue of the debate becomes crucial when a religious custom is defended on the basis of being an ancient and unalterable practice.

The Sabarimala controversy, thus, reflects the question not only of religion but of equality, dignity, freedom of religion and the role of the Constitution in protecting individuals’ rights.

The Supreme Court’s 2018 judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala examined the constitutionality of the restriction to the entry of women between 10 and 50 years of age in the Sabarimala Temple. The Court held by a majority a part of the restriction to be unconstitutional, raising important questions about the scrutiny of religious practices and the level of protection to be extended to them under Articles 25 and 26. These larger questions of interpretation were referred to a larger bench.

The debate, therefore, is not restricted to whether a tradition is old, but also to whether every religious tradition is automatically protected when there is a conflict with constitutional rights.

The Constitution protects the religious freedom of individuals to profess, practice, and propagate their religion. However, the Constitution does not protect religious freedom absolutely, it is subject to the state’s authority to restrict or regulate in the context of public order, morality, and health. The Constitution permits the state to make laws for the social welfare of its citizens.

Hence, gender discrimination based on religious practices needs to be considered within this constitutional framework. Moreover, if the Constitution of India permits men to enter the temple, but prohibits women from doing so on grounds of gender, the rationale of excluding women based on their physiological being needs to be scrutinized within the constitutional jurisprudence.

This does not mean that every religious practice concerning menstruation is automatically unconstitutional. Religious communities may follow different rituals and traditions. The constitutional concern arises when such a belief becomes a basis to deny individuals a right or access that others enjoy.

The Essential Religious Practices Question

One of the most important doctrines in Indian constitutional law is that of Essential Religious Practices (ERP).

Essentially developed through Supreme Court decisions to determine which religious practices receive constitutional protection under Articles 25 and 26, the question is about whether a practice is genuinely essential to the religion or a practice that has developed as part of religious custom and administration.

This distinction is important since not every practice performed in the name of religion is an essential religious practice.

In the Sabarimala case, therefore, the Court had to examine whether excluding women between the ages of 10 and 50 was an essential part of the worship of Lord Ayyappa. The 2018 majority concluded that the exclusion could not be protected simply by labelling it as an essential religious practice.

The judgment also examined the relationship between individual religious freedom and the rights claimed by the temple authorities. However, the broader question of how courts should determine essential religious practices was controversial and led to a reference to a larger bench in 2020 to consider some key questions concerning the relation between Articles 25 and 26, religious practices and judicial review.

Thus, the constitutional debate is ongoing.

Does the Deity’s Celibacy Justify Exclusion?

A major justification associated with the Sabarimala tradition is the belief that Lord Ayyappa is a Naishtika Brahmachari, i.e., an eternal celibate.

The argument is that women of menstruating age should therefore not enter the shrine.

However, this raises an important question: Is the exclusion of women necessarily the only way in which the belief in Ayyappa’s celibacy can be practised?

Lord Ayyappa is worshipped at several temples, and the traditions surrounding his worship are not identical everywhere. Likewise, Hanuman is traditionally regarded as a celibate deity, yet women worship him in temples across India.

These examples do not, by themselves, legally prove that the Sabarimala restriction is unconstitutional. Different temples can have different traditions. However, they do raise a serious question about whether the exclusion of women is an indispensable religious requirement or a particular interpretation of religious tradition.

This distinction is crucial to the ERP inquiry.

Articles 14 and 15: Equality and Sex-Based Discrimination

Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.

A classification is not automatically unconstitutional simply because it treats two groups differently. The State must generally show that the classification has a reasonable basis and is connected to the purpose of the law.

Article 15 is even more directly relevant since it prohibits discrimination on grounds including sex. Article 15(2) also addresses access to certain public places and facilities.

Therefore, when access to a public religious institution is restricted on the basis of sex, the constitutional implications cannot simply be ignored because of the nature of restriction being a religious custom.

The question becomes whether the restriction has a constitutionally valid basis and whether it can withstand the protections given to equality and religious freedom together.

Article 17 and the Idea of “Purity”

Article 17 abolishes untouchability.

However, it is important not to conflate Article 17 with every form of menstrual exclusion. The constitutional relevance and scope of “untouchability” has traditionally been associated with caste-based practices.

The stronger argument is that the language of purity and pollution surrounding menstruation deserves constitutional scrutiny when it becomes a reason for excluding women from public religious spaces.

The Supreme Court’s Sabarimala judgment itself examined the relationship between notions of purity, exclusion and constitutional morality.

Therefore, the argument should not be that menstruation automatically amounts to “untouchability”, but rather whether exclusion due to ideas of menstrual impurity is compatible with the Constitution’s commitment to dignity and equality.

Can Religious Autonomy Override Individual Rights?

Article 26 protects the right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion.

However, Article 26 is not an unlimited power. The Constitution creates a balance between collective religious autonomy and individual rights. The difficulty arises when a religious institution claims an institutional right and an individual claims a fundamental right.

The Sabarimala judgment is significant precisely because it put these competing claims before the Court. One of the majority opinions concluded that the Sabarimala temple could not claim the protection of Article 26 as a separate religious denomination in the circumstances of the case.

The constitutional question, therefore, is not whether religion should be protected. That it should. The question is whether religious autonomy can be used to justify exclusion that is in conflict with fundamental constitutional guarantees.

Beyond Sabarimala

The importance of Sabarimala extends beyond one temple. India has had repeated encounters with constitutional conflicts involving social practices defended in the name of tradition.

The Constitution does not require society to give up on religion, but creates a framework in which religious freedom and individual dignity must co-exist.

The real question is determining where the constitutional boundary lies.

If a practice is genuinely essential to a religion, courts must carefully examine the level of protection extended to it. If a practice is primarily a custom, administrative rule or social practice, its religious label should not automatically remove it beyond the reach of constitutional scrutiny.

This is why the Essential Religious Practices doctrine remains so important and controversial.

Conclusion

The Sabarimala debate is essentially about more than whether women should enter one particular temple. It raises a larger constitutional question: When tradition and individual equality appear to conflict, how should a constitutional democracy respond?

The answer can neither be found by asking how old a practice is, nor comparing one exclusion with another. The Constitution protects religion but also protects equality and dignity. The challenge for constitutional law, therefore, is not to decide whether religion or equality matters more, but to determine how both can co-exist without allowing religious custom to become an automatic justification for discrimination.

The Sabarimala judgment opened this difficult conversation. The reference to a larger bench shows that the legal questions surrounding religious freedom, essential religious practices and judicial review remain significant and contested.

Ultimately, the constitutional promise is simple: Faith may shape how people worship, but the Constitution determines the minimum rights that every citizen is entitled to enjoy.