Pankajakshi (Dead) Through LRs. v. Chandrika & Ors. (2016)

Introduction

Pankajakshi (Dead) Through LRs. v. Chandrika & Ors. is a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court concerning the relationship between Section 98(2) CPC and Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125, as applicable to the Kerala High Court.

The Supreme Court held that Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act is a special provision governing appeals before the Kerala High Court and prevails over the general provision contained in Section 98(2) CPC.

The judgment is important for the principle that where a special statute applicable to a particular High Court contains a specific appellate procedure, that special provision can prevail over the general provisions of the CPC. The Court also held that the earlier decision in P.V. Hemalatha v. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda was wrongly decided to the extent it took a contrary view.

Case Details

Case Name

Pankajakshi (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. v. Chandrika & Ors.

Year

2016

Citation

(2016) 6 SCC 157; AIR 2016 SC 1213

Court

Supreme Court of India

Date of Judgment

25 February 2016

Bench

Justice R. F. Nariman, Justice Anil R. Dave, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice Shiva Kirti Singh and Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 201 of 2005

Relevant Provisions

• Section 98(2), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
• Section 9, Kerala High Court Act, 1958
• Section 23, Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125
• Principles concerning special and general statutes
• Principles relating to difference of opinion between appellate judges

Subject Matter

Difference of opinion between appellate judges, Section 98(2) CPC, Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, Kerala High Court Act, special law versus general law and appellate procedure.

Facts of the Case

The respondent, Chandrika, instituted a suit before the Subordinate Judge, Kottayam, Kerala.

She alleged that her father, Raghavan, had died intestate on 18 June 1984.

According to Chandrika, the defendants were relying upon a Will dated 14 June 1984, which she alleged was not a genuine Will executed by her father.

The defendants maintained that the Will was genuine and valid.

The trial court, by its judgment dated 7 September 1994, held that the defendants had failed to prove that the disputed Will was the true and genuine Will of Raghavan.

The trial court consequently decreed Chandrika’s suit.

Appeal Before the Kerala High Court

The aggrieved defendants filed an appeal before the Kerala High Court.

The appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of two Judges.

The two Judges disagreed on the factual issue concerning the genuineness of the Will.

One Judge took the view that the Will was genuine.

The other Judge came to the conclusion that the Will was not genuine.

There was therefore a difference of opinion between the two Judges.

The question then arose as to what procedure should be followed when two Judges of the Kerala High Court disagree in an appeal.

Statutory Conflict

Two provisions became relevant.

Section 98(2) CPC

Section 98(2) CPC contains a general rule dealing with a difference of opinion between two Judges hearing an appeal.

Where the Judges differ on a point of fact or law, the provision contains a mechanism for dealing with the absence of a majority.

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125, contained a special provision governing what was to happen when Judges of that High Court differed in an appeal.

The crucial question was whether Section 23 continued to operate after the enactment of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, or whether it had been repealed and replaced by Section 98(2) CPC.

Proceedings Before the Supreme Court

The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

The principal legal controversy was not whether the Will was genuine on merits.

The central issue was:

Which provision governed the procedure to be followed when two Judges of the Kerala High Court differed in an appeal — Section 98(2) CPC or Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act?

Issues Before the Supreme Court

1. Whether Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 continued to remain in force after the enactment of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958?
2. Whether Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act repealed Section 23 of the earlier Travancore-Cochin Act?
3. Whether Section 98(2) CPC was applicable to the Kerala High Court in preference to Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin Act?
4. Which provision should prevail where the special High Court Act and the general CPC prescribe different procedures?

Judgment of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 continued to remain in force.

The Court held that Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 repealed the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Act only insofar as those provisions related to matters provided for in the Kerala High Court Act.

Section 23 was not covered by that limited repeal because the Kerala High Court Act did not make an equivalent provision dealing with the specific situation addressed by Section 23.

Therefore, Section 23 survived.

Special Law Prevails Over General Law

The central principle is that:

A special law applicable to a particular court prevails over a general law such as the CPC where there is an inconsistency.

The Supreme Court observed that the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act is a special law applicable specifically to the Kerala High Court, whereas the CPC is a general law applicable to courts generally.

Accordingly, the special provision contained in Section 23 prevailed over the general provision contained in Section 98(2) CPC.

Section 23 Was Not Repealed

The Supreme Court carefully examined the wording of Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.

Section 9 provided for repeal of the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act only insofar as those provisions related to matters provided for in the Kerala High Court Act.

The Court held that Section 23 dealt with a matter not provided for in the Kerala High Court Act in the same manner.

Therefore, the provision survived.

The repeal was limited and specific, rather than a complete repeal of every provision of the earlier High Court Act.

Rejection of P.V. Hemalatha

The Constitution Bench expressly held that the earlier decision in P.V. Hemalatha v. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda & Anr. was wrongly decided to the extent that it took a view contrary to the continued operation of Section 23.

This was a significant aspect of the judgment.

The Constitution Bench therefore overruled the contrary position taken in P.V. Hemalatha.

Difference Between Special and General Law

The judgment provides a useful example of the principle:

Special law overrides general law where the two occupy the same field and are inconsistent.

Here:

• CPC = General procedural law.
• Travancore-Cochin High Court Act = Special law applicable to the Kerala High Court.

Therefore, where Section 23 of the special Act governed the particular matter, it took precedence over Section 98(2) CPC.

Role of Section 4 CPC

The reasoning also reflects the broader principle contained in Section 4 CPC.

The CPC does not ordinarily repeal or override special laws or special jurisdictions unless the contrary is expressly provided or necessarily implied.

Therefore, the existence of a general procedural provision in the CPC does not automatically eliminate a special statutory rule applicable to a particular court.

Difference of Opinion Between Judges

The case is important for understanding what happens when judges hearing an appeal disagree.

The Constitution Bench held that the procedure prescribed by Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act would govern the situation in the Kerala High Court.

The special statutory mechanism therefore had to be followed rather than the mechanism contained in Section 98(2) CPC.

Broader Principle of Statutory Interpretation

The judgment reinforces several principles of statutory construction:

Special Law vs. General Law

A special statute governing a particular subject takes precedence over a general statute where they conflict.

Limited Repeal

A repeal clause must be read according to its actual language. Courts should not assume that an earlier statute has been completely repealed where the legislature has provided only a limited repeal.

Harmonious Construction

Courts should attempt to give effect to both statutes wherever possible.

Specific Provision Controls

A specific provision directed at a particular court or situation takes precedence over a general procedural provision dealing with courts generally.

Ratio Decidendi

The ratio decidendi of Pankajakshi v. Chandrika is:

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 is a special provision governing the procedure to be followed in the Kerala High Court where there is a difference of opinion between Judges hearing an appeal. Section 23 was not repealed by Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, because the latter repealed the earlier provisions only insofar as they related to matters provided for in the new Act. Being a special provision, Section 23 prevails over the general provision contained in Section 98(2) CPC.

The Supreme Court therefore held that the contrary view in P.V. Hemalatha was incorrect.

Important Legal Principles

1. Special Law Prevails Over General Law

A special statutory provision applicable to a particular High Court prevails over a general CPC provision where the two conflict.

2. Section 23 Survived

Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act remained operative after enactment of the Kerala High Court Act.

3. Repeal Was Limited

Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act did not repeal every provision of the earlier Act.

4. CPC Is General Law

The CPC is a general procedural statute applicable to courts generally.

5. High Court Act Is Special Law

A statute specifically governing a High Court has special status in relation to matters governed by that statute.

6. Section 98(2) CPC Does Not Automatically Apply

The general rule under Section 98(2) cannot displace a special statutory provision applicable to the same High Court.

7. P.V. Hemalatha Overruled

The Constitution Bench held that P.V. Hemalatha was wrongly decided to the extent it conflicted with this principle.

8. Section 4 CPC Supports Special Laws

The CPC does not ordinarily override special laws unless the statute provides otherwise.

Practical Application

Suppose a special High Court statute contains a specific procedure for dealing with a disagreement between two Judges hearing an appeal.

Later, the CPC contains a general provision dealing with differences of opinion between appellate Judges.

If the special statute remains in force and the two provisions are inconsistent, the court should ordinarily apply the special statutory procedure.

The presence of the general CPC provision does not automatically repeal the special rule.

Difference Between General and Special Law

General Law	Special Law
Applies broadly to courts or cases generally.	Applies to a particular court, subject or class of cases.
CPC is a general procedural statute.	Travancore-Cochin High Court Act was a special statute for that High Court.
Applies where no special provision displaces it.	Prevails over general law in case of conflict.
Broad and general in character.	Specific and targeted.

Why This Case Is Important

Pankajakshi v. Chandrika is important for:

• Section 98(2) CPC;
• Section 4 CPC;
• Kerala High Court appellate procedure;
• Travancore-Cochin High Court Act;
• Kerala High Court Act;
• Special law versus general law;
• Repeal of statutes;
• Difference of opinion between Judges;
• Statutory interpretation;
• Constitution Bench jurisprudence.

The case is particularly important because it clarifies the continued operation of a historical special statute governing the Kerala High Court.

Law Student and Judiciary Relevance

For examinations, remember the central proposition:

Special law prevails over general law.

In this case:

Section 23, Travancore-Cochin High Court Act = Special provision

Section 98(2), CPC = General provision

Therefore:

Section 23 prevails over Section 98(2) CPC.

Also remember:

Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act did not completely repeal the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act; repeal operated only insofar as the earlier provisions related to matters provided for in the new Act.

Relationship With Section 100 CPC

The judgment has an important indirect relevance to second appeals and Section 100 CPC, especially in appeals arising from Kerala and historically governed by special High Court legislation.

The Supreme Court’s broader principle is that before mechanically applying Section 100 or another general CPC provision, the court must examine whether a special statutory provision governing the particular High Court applies.

This principle has subsequently been relied upon in cases concerning appeals arising from Punjab and Haryana and the continued operation of special High Court legislation.

Relationship With Later Cases

The principle in Pankajakshi has been followed in later Supreme Court decisions dealing with special appellate provisions.

The judgment is particularly significant in cases involving the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, where Section 41 has been held to continue to govern second appeals in Punjab and Haryana despite the general provisions of Section 100 CPC.

Thus, the case represents a broader principle:

A special appellate provision may prevail over Section 100 CPC when the special statute has not been repealed and occupies the relevant field.

Key Takeaways

Concept	Principle
Section 23 Travancore-Cochin Act	Special provision governing differences of opinion in Kerala High Court appeals.
Section 98(2) CPC	General provision dealing with differences between appellate Judges.
Conflict	Special provision prevails over general provision.
Section 9 Kerala High Court Act	Did not completely repeal Section 23 of the earlier Act.
Special Law	High Court-specific legislation is special law.
CPC	General procedural law.
P.V. Hemalatha	Overruled to the extent inconsistent with Pankajakshi.
Section 4 CPC	Supports preservation of special statutory provisions.
Statutory Interpretation	Repeal must be determined according to the actual language of the repealing provision.
Broader Principle	General CPC provisions cannot automatically override a surviving special appellate provision.

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Conclusion

Pankajakshi (Dead) Through LRs. v. Chandrika is a Constitution Bench authority establishing that Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 continued to operate despite the enactment of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.

The Supreme Court held that the special provision governing the Kerala High Court prevailed over the general rule in Section 98(2) CPC. The Court also clarified that the repeal under Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act was limited and did not extend to provisions concerning matters not provided for in the new Act.

The judgment is therefore an important authority on special law versus general law, repeal, appellate procedure and the continuing operation of special High Court legislation.

Pankajakshi v. Chandrika establishes that the special appellate procedure under the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act prevails over the general CPC provision where the two conflict.