Instagram Chats Alone Can’t Prove Wife Is ‘Living in Adultery’ to Deny Maintenance: Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that social media messages alone cannot establish that a wife is “living in adultery” for the purpose of denying maintenance.

What Happened

The Allahabad High Court has held that a husband cannot rely merely on social media messages to establish that his wife is “living in adultery” without corroborative evidence of physical intimacy or cohabitation.

Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay dismissed the husband’s criminal revision and affirmed the Family Court’s order granting maintenance to the wife.

The Court examined three connected issues: the meaning of “living in adultery”, the burden of proving the statutory disqualification, and the admissibility of the Instagram chats relied upon by the husband.

On the first issue, the Court treated “living in adultery” as referring to a continuous, ongoing and habitual course of adulterous conduct. It distinguished such conduct from a single lapse, conversational interactions, professional associations or unsubstantiated suspicion.

The Court further held that the party alleging the statutory disqualification must establish it through clear and cogent evidence. In this case, the husband’s reliance was principally on printouts of Instagram chats that he claimed were exchanged between his wife and an advocate.

The Court found that the printouts were not accompanied by the mandatory certificate required under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The material therefore could not properly be treated as admissible electronic evidence.

The Court also made a fallback finding. Even if the unverified chats were considered, text messages on a social media platform, without corroborative evidence of physical intimacy or cohabitation, would not be sufficient to establish that the wife was continuously “living in adultery”.

The Court consequently dismissed the revision and affirmed the Family Court’s order dated 1 October 2025.

Background & Context

The marriage between the parties was admitted, but the spouses had begun living separately following marital discord.

The wife initiated maintenance proceedings before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Sambhal at Chandausi, stating that she could not maintain herself while her husband had sufficient means but had neglected and refused to maintain her. The Family Court allowed her application by an order dated 1 October 2025 in Case No. 924 of 2024.

The husband challenged that order through a criminal revision under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

His principal argument was that the wife was disqualified from receiving maintenance because, according to his allegation, she was “living in adultery” with an advocate. He also argued that she had left the matrimonial home without sufficient or justifiable grounds.

To support the allegation, he relied on printouts of Instagram chats that he claimed had taken place between his wife and the advocate. The allegation remained the husband’s claim; the Court did not make a finding that the alleged relationship existed.

The wife and the State opposed the revision. Among other submissions, they argued that maintenance provisions are intended to prevent neglect and destitution and that “living in adultery” requires a continuous course of conduct rather than isolated interactions or suspicion.

The Court referred to the social-welfare purpose of maintenance proceedings and relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dukhtar Jahan v. Mohd. Farooq and Rajnesh v. Neha. It noted that such proceedings are summary in nature and are to be interpreted in a manner consistent with their beneficent purpose.

The statutory exception considered by the Court provides that a wife is not entitled to maintenance if she is “living in adultery”, refuses without sufficient reason to live with her husband, or the parties live separately by mutual consent. The provision appears under Section 125 of the CrPC and is now carried into Section 144 of the BNSS.

The Court separately considered the electronic evidence relied upon by the husband. It referred to Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal concerning the certification requirement for electronic evidence.

Key Details

• Court/Forum: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Single Bench, Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay, Court No. 85.
• Date: Order dated 29 September 2026, marked “Reserved”. Bar & Bench reported the decision on 2 October 2026.
• Case: Criminal Revision No. 7800 of 2025, SK v. State of U.P. and Another.
• Provisions: Sections 438 and 442 BNSS; Section 125 CrPC / Section 144 BNSS; Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• Parties: The husband as revisionist, the State of U.P., and the wife as opposite party no. 2. The personal names of the parties are redacted in the order.
• Lower Court: Principal Judge, Family Court, Sambhal at Chandausi, Case No. 924 of 2024.
• Current Status: The revision was dismissed and the Family Court’s maintenance order stands.

Why It Matters

The ruling provides a practical illustration of what must be established when a husband seeks to defeat a wife’s maintenance claim on the ground that she is “living in adultery”.

The statutory words “living in” are significant. The Court treated them as requiring evidence of a continuous and habitual course of conduct rather than allowing the conclusion to be drawn merely from conversations, professional associations or suspicion.

The burden also remains on the party asserting the disqualification. The Court emphasised the need for clear and cogent evidence rather than requiring the wife to disprove an allegation made against her.

The case also demonstrates how substantive legal requirements interact with electronic-evidence rules. The Instagram printouts relied upon by the husband lacked the certificate required under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court therefore did not treat them as admissible evidence.

Importantly, however, the ruling should not be read as establishing that social media messages can never be relevant in maintenance proceedings. The Court made a fact-specific determination based on the material placed before it. Its alternative finding was that even if the chats were read, messages without corroboration of physical intimacy or cohabitation would not satisfy the standard required to establish continuous “living in adultery”.

The Court also did not determine whether the alleged relationship between the wife and the advocate existed or did not exist. Its conclusion was narrower: the evidence relied upon by the husband did not establish the statutory disqualification required to deny maintenance.

For law students and practitioners, the decision therefore brings together three points that often arise separately: the meaning of “living in adultery”, the allocation of the burden of proof, and the evidentiary requirements applicable to electronic records.

Closing

The Allahabad High Court’s decision underscores that an allegation capable of disqualifying a wife from maintenance must be established through legally admissible and sufficiently cogent evidence. On the material before it, the Court found that unverified Instagram chat printouts, even if considered, did not establish the continuous conduct contemplated by the statutory phrase “living in adultery”.