

— INTERNATIONAL —
MOOT COURT
— COMPETITION - 2026 —

BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

— THE CASE CONCERNING —

The Sarneth Valley



INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

SPECIAL AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF ARAGON (APPLICANT) AND THE STATE OF VIZIER (RESPONDENT) TO
SUBMIT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES
CONCERNING THE SARNETH VALLEY AND RELATED MATTERS

Jointly Notified To The Court On 20th March 2026

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

COMPROMIS

ENTRE LE ROYAUME D'ARAGON (DEMANDEUR) ET L'ÉTAT DU VIZIER (DÉFENDEUR) VISANT À
SOUMETTRE À LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE LES DIFFÉRENDS QUI OPPOSENT LES
PARTIES CONCERNANT LA VALLÉE DE SARNETH ET LES QUESTIONS CONNEXES

notifié conjointement à la Cour le 20 mars 2026

JOINT NOTIFICATION

ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT

The Hague, 20 March 2026

On behalf of the Applicant, the Kingdom of Aragon, and the Respondent, the State of Vizier, in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an original of the Special Agreement concerning the differences between the Parties relating to the situation in the Sarneth Valley of Vizier and associated matters, signed in The Hague, The Netherlands, on the fifteenth day of March in the year two thousand twenty-six.

(Signed)

His Excellency Adrian Velas
Ambassador of the Kingdom of Aragon
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

(Signed)

Her Excellency Liyana Farouk
Ambassador of the State of Vizier
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

SPECIAL AGREEMENT

SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BY THE KINGDOM OF ARAGON AND THE STATE OF VIZIER

The Kingdom of Aragon (“Applicant”) and the State of Vizier (“Respondent”) (hereinafter “the Parties”);
Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the situation in the Sarneth Valley of Vizier, the conduct of hostilities, migration control measures and diplomatic relations;
Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to resolve these differences through negotiation;
Desiring to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court of Justice (“the Court”) for resolution;
Have concluded this Special Agreement:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties submit the questions contained in this Special Agreement (together with any Corrections and Clarifications) (“the Case”) to the Court pursuant to Article 40(I) of its Statute.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties agree that the Kingdom of Aragon shall appear as Applicant and the State of Vizier as Respondent, without prejudice to any question of the burden of proof.

ARTICLE 3

The applicable law shall be that referred to in Article 38(I) of the Statute of the Court.

ARTICLE 4

- (a) All procedural matters shall be governed by the Official Rules of the 2026 Asian Law College International Moot Court Competition.
- (b) The Parties request that written proceedings consist of one round of Memorials submitted in accordance with the Official Schedule of the Competition.

ARTICLE 5

- (a) The Parties shall accept any judgment of the Court as final and binding and shall execute it in good faith.
 - (b) Following the judgment, the Parties shall enter into negotiations regarding its implementation.
- Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this fifteenth day of March in the year two thousand twenty-six, in triplicate in the English language.

(Signed)
Elena Marquez
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kingdom of Aragon

(Signed)
Karim Dastan
Minister of External Relations
State of Vizier

CASE CONCERNING THE SARNETH VALLEY AND RELATED MATTERS

STATEMENT OF AGREED FACTS

Aragon/Vizier

1. The Kingdom of Aragon has been a home to various ethnic tribes bordering Vizier. Both nations have a rich history of cultural exchange spanning 500 years. The region in recent years has been geopolitically volatile owing to flashpoints which have arisen over economic issues. There has been considerable focus on development of the digital infrastructure cutting across frontiers marked with rising technological progress. Both countries are parties to the international conventions related to armed conflict and diplomatic relations.
2. Peoples' Liberation Front (PLF) a non-state armed group comprising of tribal militia exercised territorial control over the Sarneth Valley of Vizier as a result of a protracted armed struggle against the state military in 2024. The militia mushroomed out of certain mercenary forces active in the region with the support of local ethnic tribal communities. Their territorial control and field operations became heavily dependent upon decentralized digital channels of communication.
3. Vizier maintained throughout that PLF operated through a web of cross border assistance built upon isolated networking platforms. The growing influence of the militia within the region was slated to have strengthened through sustained cyber coordination closely synchronized with technically encrypted data-routing platforms. Integration of digital frameworks within warfare became a common occurrence within Vizier.
4. In January, 2026 the state military launched a brutal offensive against the PLF operatives targeting wide perimeters within the Sarneth Valley. Arsenal used by the forces included explosives with far-reaching impact in the urban centers. It was reported by certain independent fact finding committees that significant damage was caused to the civilian infrastructure as well. However, Vizier rubbished such reports, claiming that its operation only chose legitimate militant installations cultivated by PLF, embedded within civilian areas deliberately, to shield against such attacks.
5. Although, satellite imagery and digital forensic analysis indicated that the strikes were carried out at densely populated zones, the attribution of intent and the legality of the strike itself remains a fiercely contested issue. The humanitarian consequences of the attack were manifest leading to several casualties and serious injuries. But the government defended the actions citing the proportionate nature of the attack.
6. First week of February, 2026, witnessed a large section of the native population residing in the Sarneth Valley, crossing over to the relatively safer cities in Aragon. The rapidly deteriorating humanitarian catastrophe was fueled by economic distress and lack of adequate healthcare. Waterborne diseases affected large segments of an already battered community across the Sarneth Valley.

7. Coupled with the volatile atmosphere, national security concerns escalated in Aragon considering the massive influx of civilian population fleeing the strife ridden areas. Political demands for monitoring and regulation of incoming refuge-seeking individuals translated into governmental action throughout the frontiers of Aragon specifically where it shared its boundary with Vizier. A policy of “Humanitarian Processing Corridors (HPC)” was established premised around biometric registration and artificial intelligence-powered risk assessment algorithms were deployed.

8. Individuals were processed through an AI-assisted system that generated risk scores. These scores were derived through a systematically layered criteria involving reconstruction of movement patterns. Such an intelligent assessment was made relying upon telecommunications metadata inferred through social networks and contact-chain analysis. Even a behavioral anomaly determination was attempted to be conducted by discerning intelligence inputs received from third parties.

9. The HPC mechanism written into law through the Central Legislative Assembly of Aragon was uniformly enforced as a semi-autonomous decision making entity. It was designed to undertake independent algorithmic evaluations which were rarely overturned by human intervention. A scheme to weed out administrative-level human interjections overruling technological assessments was rolled out. Without informing the applicant of the specific ground behind their classification by the software and an absence of an appellate recourse apart from an internal executive review, created a sphere dominated by technology.

Certain independent technical audits carried out within the same time period often echoed concerns highlighting the homogeneity of the data clusters reflecting only individuals hailing from PLF dominated areas. Such clusters if used to train HPC algorithms, the audits affirmed, may generate structural bias in final assessments. This may also call into question the degree of transparency of the entire process including the need for individualized risk assessment.

AI System Explanation

Data Input Source	Processing Technique	Output Generated	Operational Use
Telecommunications metadata	Pattern reconstruction algorithms	Movement trajectory mapping	Identifying cross-border travel patterns
Contact-chain data	Network analysis models	Social connectivity profiles	Inferring indirect associations
Behavioral indicators	Anomaly detection systems	Behavioral risk flags	Identifying irregular patterns
Intelligence-sharing inputs	Data fusion systems	Composite risk indicators	Supporting classification decisions

11. Individuals classified as “security concern cases” were transferred to a “Transitional Security Buffer Zone” located between the de facto boundary lines of Aragon and Vizier. Aragon maintained that the zone lay outside its sovereign territory and was established as a temporary humanitarian and security measure.

12. Notwithstanding this neutral positioning, Aragon exercised an encompassing control within the buffer zone. It was not deterred from conducting armed patrols, nor in mobilizing surveillance units armed with

tracking systems. Biometric identification protocols were so dynamic and streamlined within the demarcated area that any movement within or without the militarized zone required authorization of the designated authorities.

13. Media reports, though limited and sparse, portrayed an account of a state of complete disarray of legal remedies within the buffer zone. Effectively this meant a denial of overt humanitarian assistance or suppression of distress calls made by individuals residing within such zones.

14. Aragon publicly held Vizier responsible, pointing towards its role in the intensification of the armed conflict in the Sarneth Valley. Instead of providing security to its destitute ethnic communities stuck in a war zone, the entire attention was centered towards the eradication of PLF, claimed Aragon. It highlighted how such an approach was a blatant betrayal of established humanitarian principles applicable to armed conflicts.

15. Vizier for its part rejected these claims, contending that any displacement was an incidental consequence. According to its stance non state actors purposely operating from densely populated regions as part of evading strategy cannot be left unchecked. It called for the acceptability of proportionate responses in such situations throughout the world.

16. Vizier stressed upon the conduct of Aragon in systematically and strategically exploiting the humanitarian crisis to justify the algorithmically powered migration control tactic. Such conduct, as per Vizier, engaged the international liability of Aragon under relevant customary and conventional legal norms.

17. In March 2026, General Kael Varin, a senior military commander within the Vizierian armed forces, switched sides and flipped expressing his loyalty towards Aragon owing to a major political fallout within military ranks. A restricted protective assurance was meted out to the Vizierian turncoat conditioned on a full-fledged cooperation with international investigative measures launched to address the situation in the Sarneth Valley.

18. A variety of materials divulged by Varin strengthened suspicions about myriad instances ranging from reckless to deliberate military assaults perpetrated against civilian infrastructure by the Vizierian forces. His evidence circled around internal communication notes and drone visuals recovered through perilous efforts among other things.

19. Vizier formally took up the issue of extradition of Varin with the Aragonian ambassador putting forth his alleged involvement in treachery and desertion, a court martial offence, punishable with death under the domestic legal provisions of the country. However, the request was denied even though a bilateral extradition treaty existed on grounds of unfair persecution and an orchestrated witch-hunt against the defector upon repatriation.

20. Soon thereafter, acting on reports of routing of crucial digital information through Aragonian embassy in Vizier to the militant base of PLF, the Vizierian military ransacked the diplomatic premises.

Such action was backed by executive edicts stemming out of national security and territorial integrity related concerns. The embassy was characterized as a nodal point for secure relay of communication contributing to hostile cyber warfare.


21. During the operation targeting the embassy several accredited diplomatic agents were temporarily detained apart from seizure of encrypted communication devices. The raiding units did not stop at this but further subjected secure servers to forensic imaging without offering any publicly verifiable proof of institutional involvement of the diplomatic agents in compromising conduct.

22. Following the above chain of events, both parties expelled diplomatic personnel after issuing formal protests. The deterioration of diplomatic relations signaled a tumultuous period for the region. With no resolution in sight, the country of Aragon approached the International Court of Justice invoking the liability of Vizier. Both parties having accepted the jurisdiction of the court led the matter to be decided upon merits.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

1. Whether Aragon's use of AI-driven risk profiling and algorithmic decision-making in migration control is consistent with its obligations under international law?
2. Whether the conduct of Aragon in transferring and subjecting individuals to restrictions within the Transitional Security Buffer Zone engages its international responsibility?
3. Whether Vizier's conduct during the armed conflict may give rise to international responsibility for large-scale cross-border displacement?
4. Whether the principle of inviolability of diplomatic premises under international law admits limitations in situations involving alleged misuse for cyber or transnational security operations?

ANNEXURE – I





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